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In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a 
patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external 
patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal to the 
industry patentee. We show that a merger is profitable only for the case of small 
innovations whereas only large innovations make it welfare improving. As a 
consequence, the antitrust authority should forbid all (profitable) mergers. 
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Generation of innovations is mainly carried out by either specialized research laboratories or
by the R&D departments of manufacturing ﬁrms. In the former case, they make proﬁts by
licensing their patents. In the latter, ﬁrms may also exploit their innovations themselves.
The focus of this paper is to analyze the endogenous decision of a research laboratory
on whether to remain independent or to merge with a manufacturing ﬁrm in the industry,
as well as its implications for antitrust. In other words, we aim to compare in terms of
proﬁts and welfare a case in which the innovating ﬁrm is external to the industry (an inde-
pendent laboratory) with another in which it becomes an internal to the industry patentee.
For example, in 1999 Celltech Chiroscience, a science-driven biotechnology ﬁrm merged with
Medeva, a pharmaceutical ﬁrm, creating Celltech Group, the UK’s fourth largest pharma-
ceutical ﬁrm. Peter Fellner, Celltech’s chief executive argued that the merger was aimed
principally at retaining a greater share of proﬁts by pushing products through its own sales
force rather than licensing them out.1
Apart from being a rather common phenomenon, the comparison proposed is also in-
teresting from the point of view of the patent licensing literature because, to the best of
our knowledge, no paper had endogenized the decision on whether to be an external or an
internal patentee. So far, this literature has mainly focused on deriving optimal licensing
contracts when the patentee is either an external or an internal to the industry patentee.
For the case of an external patentee, Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986), Katz and Shapiro
(1986), Kamien et al. (1992) show that licensing a non-drastic innovation by means of a
royalty is less proﬁtable than licensing it by means of a ﬁxed fee or an auction. Much of
this literature was reviewed in Kamien (1992). Saracho (2002) shows that in a strategic
delegation context a royalty could be superior to a ﬁx e df e ef o ra ne x t e r n a lp a t e n t e e .
Regarding the case of an internal patentee Wang (1998), Wang and Yang (1999), Kamien
and Tauman (2002) show that a royalty is preferred to a ﬁxed fee by the patentee.
With the aim to study whether it is more proﬁtable to license innovations as an inde-
1Financial Times, November 12, 1999.
3pendent laboratory (external patentee) or to have also the possibility to exploit them by
directly participating in the market (internal patentee), we ﬁrst derive the optimal two-part
tariﬀ contracts2 for the case of an external patentee licensing a cost-reducing innovation to
ad i ﬀerentiated Cournot duopoly3. This result, which is not central to this paper is, to our
view, an important contribution to the patent licensing literature. In particular, we obtain
a similar result than in the case of an internal patentee, namely that, in order to control
market competition, a royalty is always included in the optimal contract. This contrasts
with the traditional view arguing that ﬁxed fees are superior to royalties for the case of an
external patentee.
Second, we use the result on the optimal two-part tariﬀ contract to license the innovation
to a rival ﬁrm in a diﬀerentiated Cournot duopoly derived previously in Faulí-Oller and
Sandonís (2002), in order to analyze the case in which the laboratory and one of the ﬁrms
in the industry merge, becoming an internal to the industry patentee.
Third, we proceed to evaluate ﬁrms proﬁts and social welfare in equilibrium under the
two scenarios and get the main results of the paper. They are based on the balance of
two forces. On the one hand, being an internal patentee allows the laboratory to better
internalize market proﬁts whereas an external patentee has to care also about reducing the
licensees’s proﬁts in case they refuse the contracts, namely, their external options. On the
other hand, whereas an external patentee may use two instruments (one contract for each
ﬁrm) to aﬀect the market outcome, an internal patentee loses the commitment capacity to
restrict its own output because it can only use one instrument (the contract oﬀered to the
2Existing empirical evidence reveals that many licensing contracts observed in practice include two parts,
a ﬁxed fee plus a linear royalty. In particular, Rostocker (1984), for example, ﬁnds that both instruments
together are used 46% of the time, royalty alone 39% and ﬁxed fee alone 13%. Calvert (1964), Taylor and
Silberston (1973) and Macho-Stadler et al. (1996) report similar percentages.
3In order for the analysis to be non-trivial we need to assume that at least two ﬁrms exist in the industry.
With only one ﬁrm (a monopolist) in the market, a merger between the laboratory and the ﬁrm would
lead to the same outcome (monopoly) than a situation where the laboratory licenses the innovation to the
monopolist through a two-part tariﬀ contact. In this case, the patentee would charge no royalty and extract
the monopoly rents through a ﬁxed fee.
4remaining independent ﬁrm).
We show that which of the two eﬀects dominates depends on the size of the innovation.
For large innovations, the proﬁts that any ﬁrm can obtain by refusing the contract oﬀered
by the external patentee are low, which allows the patentee to care mainly about market
proﬁts, as an internal patentee. As he can do it making use of one more instrument, being
an external patentee must be more proﬁtable.
On the contrary, for small innovations, the external option of the ﬁrms is large and thus,
becoming an internal patentee turns out to be preferred, as the possibility to maximize
market proﬁts outweights the loss of one instrument the internal laboratory bears.
The evolution of social welfare follows opposite direction as proﬁts. For large innovations
an external patentee takes advantage of the use of the two instruments, which increases its
proﬁts and tends to reduce social welfare. On the contrary, for small innovations, an internal
patentee is able to better control market competition, which goes in the direction to harm
welfare.
As the option of becoming an internal to the industry patentee implies a merger between
the laboratory and one of the ﬁrms in the industry, the antitrust authority has the possibility
to block the process whenever the merger hurts welfare. We show in the paper that any
proﬁtable merger reduces social welfare. Thus, if we consider that the antitrust authorities
can approve or reject only mergers that are proposed by the merging partners ( i.e., proﬁtable
mergers), we can give a clear prescription. In our context, no merger should be allowed.4
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s .I nt h en e x ts e c t i o nw ed e r i v et h eo p t i m a l
licensing contracts for the case where the patentee is an independent laboratory and also an
internal to the industry patentee. Section 3 deals with the comparison of proﬁts and welfare
between the two cases. We conclude in Section 4.
4Of course, a merger among the laboratory and the two ﬁrms would be another possibility. The analysis of
this case would be trivial, as that merger would be proﬁtable and welfare reducing, so the antitrust authority
should forbid this kind of behavior.
52. Optimal two part tariﬀ licensing contracts
2.1. The case of an external laboratory
We consider two ﬁrms, denoted by i =1 ,2, each producing a diﬀerentiated good (goods 1
and 2 respectively). They face inverse demand functions given by:
pi =1− xi − γxj,i,j=1 ,2,i  = j (2.1)
where γ ∈ [0,1] represents the degree of product diﬀerentiation. These demands are derived
from the maximization problem of a representative consumer (see Singh and Vives (1984)),
endowed with a utility function separable in money (denoted by m)g i v e nb y :








− γx1x2 + m (2.2)
The two ﬁr m sh a v ec o n s t a n tu n i tp r o d u c t i o nc o s t so fc. There exists an independent
laboratory that have a patented process innovation that allows to produce the two goods at
a lower marginal cost, that we set, without loss of generality, to be zero. Thus, c can also be
interpreted as the size of the innovation.
Let us deﬁne the social welfare function as:
W(x1,x 2)=u(x1,x 2) − c1x1 − c2x2, (2.3)
where ci =0 ,i=1 ,2, if the technology is licensed to ﬁrm i and ci = c otherwise.
The timing of the game is as follows: In the ﬁrst stage, the laboratory oﬀers a contract
to each ﬁrm on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In the second stage, the potential licensees decide
whether to accept or reject the contract. Finally, both ﬁrms compete in quantities. We
look for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the proposed game, solving it by backward
induction. A contract oﬀered to ﬁrm i is deﬁned as a pair (fi,r i), where fi represents a
ﬁxed fee and ri a per-unit of output royalty. We do not allow for negative fees because,
otherwise, as argued by Katz and Shapiro (1985), contracts would include the possibility
6for the patent holder to “bribe(s) ﬁrms to exit the industry...and would likely be held to be
illegal by antitrust authorities.”
In the third stage, the equilibrium quantities and proﬁts if both ﬁrms have accepted the
contract are given by:




(2 − γ) − 2ri + γrj
4 − γ2 },0},
πi(ri,r j)=X2
i ,i,j=1 ,2,i = j.
(2.4)
In order to obtain the equilibrium if ﬁrm i has not accepted the contract, one has to
replace ri by c i nt h ee x p r e s s i o n sa b o v e .
In the second stage ﬁrm i accepts the contract if fi ≤ πi(ri,r j) − πi(c,rj). Observe that
in this case the only equilibrium in the second stage is both ﬁrms accepting the licensing
contract, because accepting is a strictly dominant strategy. If ﬁrm j accepts, ﬁrm i also
prefers to accept5, because πi(c,rj) ≤ πi(ri,r j)− fi.B u te v e ni fﬁrm j does not accept, ﬁrm
i prefers to accept, because:
πi(ri,c) − fi ≥ πi(ri,c) − πi(ri,r j)+πi(c,rj) ≥ πi(c,c)




L e tu sn o wd e r i v et h eo p t i m a lt w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀ contract(s) to license the innovation. There
are two possibilities. On the one hand, the laboratory can oﬀe rac o n t r a c tt oe a c hﬁrm. On
the other hand, it could decide to oﬀer a contract to only one ﬁrm. In the latter case there
are again two possibilities. Either the ﬁrm that does not receive an oﬀer is active in the
market once the other ﬁrm has accepted the licensing contract or not. It is direct to see that
it is not optimal to license to only one ﬁrm whenever the other ﬁrm is going to be active
in the market (either because c is not very large and/or because the royalty imposed to the
licensee is not very small). That strategy would be dominated by oﬀering the second ﬁrm
a contract with a royalty equal to c and no ﬁxed fee. This contract would not change the
royalty revenues from the ﬁrst ﬁrm but would allow the laboratory to get additional revenues
5In order to avoid the open set problem, ﬁrms are assumed to accept licensing contracts when they are
indiﬀerent between accepting and not accepting.
7from the second ﬁrm. So the other possibility is that the laboratory oﬀers a contract to one
ﬁrm so that the other ﬁrm is not going to be active in the market stage. But this situation
would be similar to oﬀering the second ﬁrm a licensing contract including the lowest royalty
such that, given c and the contract oﬀered to the ﬁrst ﬁrm, this ﬁrm would produce zero
output in equilibrium. But this situation is a possibility implicitly taken into account in
the resolution of the maximization problem we solve below for the case in which the two
potential licensees are oﬀered a contract.6
The optimal contract for the patentee then solves:
Max
f1,f2,r1,r2{r1X1(r1,r 2)+r2X2(r2,r 2)+f1 + f2}
s.t. f1 ≤ π1(r1,r 2) − π1(c,r2)
f2 ≤ π2(r2,r 1) − π2(c,r1)
f1 ≥ 0,f 2 ≥ 0.
(2.5)
As the ﬁrst two restrictions should be binding in equilibrium, the previous maximization
program can be rewritten in the following way:
Max
r1,r2{r1X1(r1,r 2)+r2X2(r2,r 1)+π1(r1,r 2)+π2(r2,r 1)
−π1(c,r2) − π2(c,r1)}
s.t. r1 ≤ c, r2 ≤ c.
(2.6)
Direct resolution of the maximization program leads to the following result:
Proposition 2.1. The optimal contract is given by:
r∗
1 = r∗
2 = r∗ =m i n {
γ(4c +( −2+γ)γ)







2 = f∗ = π1(r∗,r ∗) − π1(c,r∗).
(2.7)
6We could also assume that asymmetric contracts including royalties such that one of the ﬁrms is expelled
out of the market are illegal from the point of view of antitrust (for example, the Danish Competition Act
does not allow upstream ﬁrms to discriminate across similar companies). This restriction would not change,
however, any of the qualitative results of the paper. In fact, as we show below, the symmetry between the
ﬁrms leads the patentee not to discriminate across them in equilibrium.
8The maximization program involves the balance of two opposite eﬀects: by increasing
the royalties market proﬁts increase but, at the same time, the proﬁts to be obtained by the
potential licensees by refusing the contract (πi(c,rj),i=1 ,2) also increase. The balance of
the two eﬀects leads to an optimal royalty that falls short of the one that would maximize
market proﬁts (r∗ =
γ
2(1 + γ)
), except when the c is so large (c ≥
4+2 γ − γ2
4(1 + γ)
= cM)
that each potential licensee gets zero proﬁts when refusing the contract. In this case, the
maximization problem implies maximizing market proﬁts and then the laboratory can obtain
the full monopoly proﬁts. Observe that the optimal royalty is strictly lower than c,w h i c h
implies that the constraint of non-negative ﬁx e df e e si sn e v e rb i n d i n g .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,
for the case of small innovations, the incentive to reduce the outside option of the licensees
could lead the laboratory to charge a negative royalty which would be compensated with a
higher ﬁxed fee.7
Finally, we can compute the equilibrium proﬁts obtained by the laboratory and the













2.2. The case of an internal to the industry patentee
Let us now analyze the case where the independent laboratory and one of the ﬁrms in the
industry (say ﬁrm 1) have merged. This implies that the merged ﬁrm obtains revenues from
licensing the innovation (r2X2(r2,0)+f2) and also from selling good 1 directly to consumers
making use of the patented technology (π1(0,r 2)). That is to say, now we have to analyze
7Another possibility would be to impose that the royalty cannot be negative. This would just imply that
for small innovations (c<
γ(2 − γ)
4
) the optimal contract would include only a ﬁx e df e ea n dn or o y a l t y ,b u t
would not change any of the qualitative results of the paper regarding the comparison between the internal
and the external patentee.
8Actual expressions have been relegated to Appendix A.
9the case of an internal to the industry patentee. In this case, the timing of the game is as
follows: ﬁrst the patentee oﬀers a licensing contract to ﬁrm 2, then ﬁrm 2 decides whether
to accept or reject it and, ﬁnally, market competition takes place.
This model has been previously analyzed in Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002).
In the ﬁrst stage, the merged ﬁrm looks for the contract (f2, r2)t h a ts o l v e s :
maxf2,r2{π1(0,r 2)+r2X2(r2,0) + f2}
s.t. f2 ≤ π2(r2,0) − π2(c,0)
(2.9)
This program can be written in a simpliﬁed way. As the ﬁrst constraint is always binding,
it can be substituted in the objective function. The maximization problem thus becomes:
maxr2{π1(0,r 2)+r2X2(r2,0) + π2(r2,0) − π2(c,0)}
s.t. r2 ≤ c.
(2.10)
Before solving the program and in order to better understand the main results in this
work it is useful to compare the maximization problems of both the external and the internal
patentee. In the latter case, the royalty is set to maximize market proﬁts because the outside
option of the licensee (π2(c,0)) does not depend on the royalty. In the former case, however,
the royalties aﬀect both market proﬁts and the outside option of ﬁr m s . T h ef a c tt h a ta n
internal patentee maximizes market proﬁts tends to give the laboratory an advantage over
the alternative of being an external patentee. We have to take into account, however, that
the alignment with market proﬁts maximization is achieved at the cost of losing one of the
two instruments that were available to the laboratory when being an external patentee (an
internal patentee can only choose one licensing contract whereas it can choose two contracts
when being an external patentee). This reduces the ﬂexibility of the internal patentee to
aﬀect the market outcome. Thus, the result on proﬁtability of the merger between the
laboratory and one of the ﬁrms depends on the balance of the two previous eﬀects.
The resolution to the above program results directly in the following contract:
r∗








10Observe that the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty9. In this way, the
patentee softens ex-post competition by raising the licensee’s marginal cost of production.
However, it never sets such a high royalty as to expel the licensee out of the market. The
reason is that whenever the goods are not perfect substitutes, licensing the innovation allows
the patentee to keep open the licensee’s proﬁtable market, and the royalty revenues obtained
more than compensate him for the increase in market competition. This is true even for the
case of a drastic innovation, namely, for values of c such that X2(c,0) = 0, which occurs
whenever c ≥ cN =( 2− γ)/2. In other words, the merged ﬁrm prefers a duopoly to a
monopoly in market one (see Proposition 4.2 in Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002)).
Finally, we can compute the equilibrium proﬁts obtained by the merged ﬁrm. They are









2,0) − π2(c,0). (2.12)
3. Merger proﬁtability and welfare
In this section we proceed to compare the two scenarios analyzed in the previous sections in
terms of proﬁts and social welfare, with the aim to evaluate ﬁrst, the private incentives of
the laboratory and one of the ﬁr m st om e r g ei no r d e rt ob e c o m ea ni n t e r n a lt ot h ei n d u s t r y
patentee and, second, the eﬀect of such behavior on social welfare in order to be able to
derive the optimal competition policy.
Regarding proﬁtability we have to sign the diﬀerence between the proﬁts of the merged
ﬁrm and the sum of the proﬁts of the external laboratory plus ﬁrm 1‘s proﬁts, namely, the
sign of Πl1 − (Π1 + Πl). We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3.1. A threshold value for the size of the innovation c1 always exists such that
below that value a merger between the laboratory and ﬁrm 1 is proﬁtable.
9In fact, one exception does exist: when γ =0 , r∗
2 =0 . In this particular case, the patentee faces the
same problem as an external laboratory licensing the innovation to a monopoly. In that case, we know that
the laboratory prefers a ﬁxed fee rather than a royalty (see Kamien and Tauman, 1986).
11Proof. See Appendix B.
In order to grasp the main intuition of the proposition it is useful to discuss what happens
when the innovation is so large that the current technology of ﬁrms cannot be used proﬁtably
by any ﬁrm when the new technology is licensed (namely, when c>c M). In this extreme case,
the external option of the licensees when the laboratory is external to the industry becomes
zero, which means that the maximization program of the laboratory implies maximizing
market proﬁts by choosing two instruments (one contract for each ﬁrm). This allows the
laboratory to implement the monopoly outcome and get the monopoly proﬁts. As an internal
patentee is not able to implement monopoly given that he can only use one instrument (a
contract for ﬁrm 2), a merger between the laboratory and ﬁrm 1 cannot be proﬁtable.
For smaller innovations the comparison is not clear because a trade-oﬀ arises. Now,
the external patentee also cares about the proﬁts that ﬁrms can obtain when rejecting the
contracts, namely, their external options. The size of the external options is decreasing in
t h es i z eo ft h ei n n o v a t i o n .T h u s ,w h e nt h ei n n o v a t i o ni ss m a l le n o u g ht h eo b j e c t i v eo ft h e
external patentee is so distorted from proﬁt maximization that, in spite of its lower ﬂexibility,
being an internal patentee becomes proﬁtable.
Notice that the threshold value c1 is related to γ in a complex, non-monotonic way. In
the extreme case of homogeneous goods (γ =1 )we get c1 = cM. This implies that the
merger cannot be unproﬁtable because for c>c M we know that in both the integrated
and disintegrated cases the monopoly outcome arises. Therefore, under homogeneous goods
becoming an internal to the industry patentee must be always (weakly) proﬁtable.
So far we have analyzed the private incentives of ﬁrms to merge. Given that mergers
have to be approved by the competition authorities it is very useful to know their eﬀect on
social welfare. This is done in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Whenever the goods are not homogeneous, large enough innovations (c>
c+) make a merger between the laboratory and ﬁrm 1 welfare improving.
Proof. See appendix B.
12The good news for welfare of a merger between the laboratory and ﬁrm 1 is that the
merged ﬁrm loses the commitment capacity to restrict its output as it cannot credibly increase
its own marginal cost (zero), compared with the case of the external patentee where the
laboratory charges a royalty (r∗)t oe a c hﬁrm. The size of this positive eﬀect on welfare
(r∗ − 0) is increasing in the size of the innovation. Large innovations allow the external
laboratory to set higher royalties, distorting a lot outputs and welfare. When the innovation
is small, however, the royalties have to be smaller and thus the positive eﬀect on welfare
produced by the merger is reduced.
The bad news for welfare of the merger is that the internal patentee completely inter-
nalizes market proﬁts which induces him to reduce market competition by charging a higher
royalty to the rival ﬁrm (r∗
2) compared to the royalty charged when he is an external paten-
tee (r∗). This negative eﬀect (r∗
2 − r∗) is decreasing in the size of the innovation10.A s a
result, as the above proposition shows, for large enough innovations the merger between the
laboratory and ﬁrm 1 becomes welfare improving.
The threshold value c1 is related to γ in a complex, non-monotonic way. In the extreme
case of homogeneous goods, however, we get c+ = cM. This implies that the merger cannot be
welfare improving because, for c>c M, we know that in both the integrated and disintegrated
cases the monopoly outcome arises. Therefore, under homogeneous goods becoming an
internal to the industry patentee must be always bad for welfare.
If we consider that the antitrust authorities can approve or reject only mergers that are
proposed by the merging partners ( i.e., proﬁtable mergers), in order to derive the optimal
c o m p e t i t i o np o l i c yw eh a v et oc o m b i n et h ea b o v ep r o p o s i t i o no nw e l f a r ew i t ht h ep r e v i o u s
result on proﬁtability.11
It is direct to see that c+ >c 1 (in other words, proﬁtable mergers are never welfare
improving). Then, a very simple rule has to be followed by the antitrust authority: to forbid
10Notice that this is not the case when r∗
2 = c (the restricted case) but, in this case, the merger is always
welfare reducing.
11It is possible that some unproﬁtable mergers increase welfare. However, compulsory action or subsidies
to carry them through would go against the normal practices of antitrust policy.
13any merger between the external laboratory and one of the ﬁr m si n s i d et h ei n d u s t r y .
4. Conclusions
In this paper we endogenize the decision of an independent research laboratory on whether
to remain external to the industry or to merge with one of the ﬁrms in the industry in order
to become an internal patentee. A basic trade-oﬀ arises. On the one hand, when being an
external patentee the laboratory aims to maximize market proﬁts minus the external option
of ﬁrms, whereas becoming an internal patentee allows the laboratory to focus on maximizing
market proﬁts. On the other hand, being an external patentee gives the laboratory more
ﬂexibility to aﬀect the market outcome as he can use two instruments (one contract for each
ﬁrm) instead of only one instrument that can be used whenever he becomes an internal
patentee. We show that the optimal decision on whether to be external or internal to the
industry (proﬁtability) and its eﬀe c to ns o c i a lw e l f a r ed e p e n do nt h es i z eo ft h ei n n o v a t i o n .
In particular, when the innovation is large the external option of ﬁrms is small and, therefore,
the objectives of both the external and the internal patentee are very similar. Thus, being an
external patentee is more proﬁtable because it gives the laboratory more ﬂexibility to control
the market outcome. When the innovation is small, the external option of ﬁrms is large and,
therefore, becoming an internal patentee allows the laboratory to better internalize market
proﬁts and becomes proﬁtable.
Regarding social welfare, a merger between the laboratory and one of the ﬁrms in the
industry has two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, it is positive because the merged ﬁrm
loses the commitment capacity to restrict its output compared with the case of the external
patentee where the laboratory charges a royalty to each ﬁrm. The size of this positive
eﬀect on welfare depends on the size of the innovation. Large innovations allow the external
laboratory to set higher royalties, distorting a lot outputs and welfare. When the innovation
is small, however, the royalties have to be smaller and thus the positive eﬀect on welfare
produced by the merger is reduced.
On the other hand, the merged ﬁrm completely internalizes market proﬁts which induces
14him to charge a higher royalty to the rival ﬁrm. This negative eﬀect is decreasing in the
size of the innovation. As we have shown in the paper, the positive eﬀect of the merger
dominates for large enough innovations.
We use the results to design the optimal competition policy. Although we ﬁnd some
welfare improving mergers, they happen to be unproﬁtable for the ﬁrms and, therefore,
they will never be presented for approval to the competition authorities. As subsidies or
compulsory action to promote mergers would go against the normal practices of antitrust
policy, the competition authorities should only care about the welfare eﬀects of mergers that
are proﬁtable. To this respect we get a very clear result, namely, that all proﬁtable mergers
reduce welfare. Thus, the prescription should be to forbid all mergers.
Notice that we have undertaken the analysis considering two-part tariﬀ licensing con-
tracts (existing empirical evidence reveals that most licensing contracts observed in practice
include two parts, a ﬁxed fee plus a linear royalty). In this context, we have shown that,
regardless of the size of the innovation and the degree of product diﬀerentiation, the optimal
decision of an external laboratory is to license the innovation to both ﬁrms and, given the
symmetry between the licensees, it does it through symmetric contracts. In other words, as
we argue in the text, under two-part tariﬀ contracts it is never optimal for the laboratory
to license the innovation to only one ﬁrm. We could consider, however, a diﬀerent licensing
mechanism. In particular, the laboratory could auction only one license (through, for exam-
ple, a sealed bid ﬁrst price auction). In this case, we can show that whenever the goods are
close enough substitutes, for large enough innovations the auction policy would be preferred
by the laboratory to the optimal two-part tariﬀ licensing contract. The intuition is easy to
understand if we consider the extreme case of homogeneous goods and a drastic innovation
(γ =1 ,c=
2−γ
2 ). In this case, the most any ﬁrm is willing to bid in the auction is the
monopoly proﬁts, given that the loser ﬁrm will be expelled out of the market. Thus, an
auction allows the patentee to get the whole monopoly proﬁts, whereas under two-part tariﬀ
contracts, the external patentee is not able to monopolize the market (he can do it only for
greater values of c, in particular, for c ≥ cM,w h e r ecM >
2−γ
2 ). As a result, an auction must
15be superior. The result also holds for values of c and γ slightly below
2−γ
2 and 1 respectively.
However, in the region where the auction becomes superior, we have that a merger is more
proﬁtable than being an external patentee under two-part tariﬀ contracts and we check that
it is also superior to the auction policy. Thus, including the possibility of an auction in
the paper would not change the result regarding the comparison of proﬁtability of being
an external or an internal patentee. Regarding welfare, auctioning only one license is never
welfare superior to licensing to both ﬁrms through the optimal two-part tariﬀ contract. So
we could prescribe not to allow for an auction in this context because licensing through two-








γ4 − 16c2(1 + γ)+8 c(4 + 2γ − γ2)
2(2 + γ)2(4 − 2γ2 + γ3)
, (5.1)
Π1 = Π2 =
(2 − γ)2(4c(1 + γ) − 4 − 2γ + γ2)2
4(2 + γ)2(4 − 2γ2 + γ3)2 .





Π1 = Π2 =0 ,
where cM =
4+2 γ − γ2
4(1 + γ)
.
When the laboratory and ﬁrm 1 merge, their equilibrium proﬁts are given by:
If c ≤ cr,t h e n
Π1l =
(2 − γ)2 + c2(−8+3 γ2)+c(8 − 4γ2 + γ3)
(4 − γ2)2 (5.3)
If cr <c≤ cN,t h e n
Π1l =
16c2(−4+3 γ2)+1 6 c(8 − 4γ − 6γ2 +3 γ3)+( 2− γ)2(16 − 8γ2 − 4γ3 + γ4)
4(4 − γ2)2(4 − 3γ2)
. (5.4)
Finally, if c>c N,we have
Π1l =






and represents the value of c that equals the optimal unrestricted
royalty (r∗





Proof of Proposition 3.1
For c ≥ cM, the external option of the licensees when the laboratory is external to
the industry becomes zero, which implies that the laboratory maximizes market proﬁts
by choosing two instruments (one contract for each ﬁrm). This allows the laboratory to
implement the monopoly outcome and get the monopoly proﬁts. As the internal patentee is
n o ta b l et oi m p l e m e n tm o n o p o l yg i v e nt h a ti tc a no n l yu s eo n ei n s t r u m e n t( ac o n t r a c tf o r
ﬁrm 2), a merger between the laboratory and ﬁrm 1 cannot be proﬁtable.
For cN ≤ c<c M, the diﬀerence12(Π1 + Πl)− Πl1 is a concave function of c with two
roots c+ and c−.W eh a v et h a tc+ >c M and cN ≤ c− <c M whenever γ ≥ 0.94 and c− <c N
whenever γ < 0.94. Therefore, a merger between the laboratory and ﬁrm 1 is proﬁtable in





    

−64 − 32γ +8 0 γ2 +1 6 γ3 − 36γ4 +1 0 γ5+
+9γ6 − 3γ7 + γ(8 + 4γ − 4γ − 4γ2 + γ4)
√
16 − 16γ − 16γ2 +2 0 γ3 − γ4 − 6γ5 +3 γ6

    

. (5.6)
For cr ≤ c<c N, the diﬀerence (Π1 +Πl)−Πl1 is a convex function of c with two roots   c
and   c.W eh a v et h a t  c<c r and cr <   c ≤ cN whenever γ ≤ 0.94. For γ > 0.94, we have that
  c>c N. Therefore, the merger is proﬁtable in this region whenever γ ≤ 0.94 and c ≤   c, or
when γ > 0.94,w h e r e






32 − 16γ − 40γ2 +2 4 γ3 +8 γ4 − 9γ5 +3 γ6+
√





12In this region the diﬀerence (Π1 +Πl)−Πl1 is characterized by the fact that the outside option of ﬁrm 2
in the integrated case (π2(c,0)) becomes zero, that is, the threshold value cN characterizes which is usually
called in the literature drastic innovation.
18Finally, for 0 ≤ c<c r, the diﬀerence (Π1 + Πl) − Πl1 is a convex function of c with
two roots c1 and c2. W eh a v et h a tc1 < 0 and c2 >c r. Therefore, a merger between the
laboratory and ﬁr m1i sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable.
Summing up, the threshold value c1 that appears in Proposition is given by: c1 =   c
whenever γ < 0.94 and c1 = c− otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
If cr ≤ c ≤ cM,t h ed i ﬀerence between welfare under both the external and the internal





    

256 + 64γ − 384γ2 − 16γ3 +1 9 2 γ4 − 16γ5 − 32γ6−
−2γ7 +2 γ8 + γ9 +3 2 c2γ(−4 − 4γ +3 γ2 +3 γ3)+
+16c(−32 + 48γ2 − 4γ3 − 22γ4 +3 γ5 +3 γ6).

    

(5.8)
We have that Wn is a concave function of c with two roots c+ and c−.W e h a v e t h a t
c− < 0 and cr <c + <c M. Therefore, a merger between the laboratory and ﬁrm 1 is welfare
















When c>c M, in the external case we have the monopoly outcome, whereas in the
internal case, outputs do not depend on c because the royalty does not depend on c either.
Therefore, the diﬀerence in welfare becomes constant in c and amounts to Wn evaluated in
c = cM. But we know from the analysis of the previous interval that a merger is welfare
improving at that point, which means that it is also welfare improving in the whole interval.
If 0 ≤ c<c r,w eh a v et h a tt h ed i ﬀerence between welfare under both the external and
the internal scenarios is given by the expression:
20Wr =
1
4(2 − γ)2(2 + γ)2(4 − 2γ2 + γ3)2

       

(2 − γ)3γ2(16 − 10γ2 +3 γ3 + γ4)+
+4c(2 − γ)2(16 − 16γ − 16γ2 +2 0 γ3
+2γ4 − 6γ5 + γ6)+2 c2(64 − 144γ2+
+32γ3 +8 8 γ4 − 48γ5 − 8γ6 +1 2 γ7 − 3γ8).

       

(5.10)
In order to show that Wr is positive in the whole interval, it is suﬃcient to check ﬁrst,
that it is a quadratic, continuous function of c,which implies that it is either a convex or a
concave function of c; second, that Wr is positive at both extremes of the interval. When Wr
is a concave function of c both points imply that it is positive in the whole interval. When
Wr is convex, we have additionally to check that its ﬁrst derivative is positive at the origin
of the interval, which completes the proof.
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